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 I. 
 
TOWARD DEFINING THE EGO 
GREEK AND MODERN VIEWPOINTS 
 
 
 
THE THREE FACULTIES OF THE EGO  
Though taken over directly from the Latin language, the term ego1 has particular 
overtones for the modern ear that cannot have been present in ancient usage. The mere 
fact that, as a personal pronoun, it was normally omitted leads to the thought that, 
throughout Graeco-Roman antiquity, consciousness of self as something separate from 
nature (however conceived) was not an experience of people of that time. A feeling of 
such separation did not become intellectually acute, apparently, much before Kant and 
particularly J. G. Fichte, whose formulation of ego and non-ego continues to be a factor 
in modern philosophy. Nevertheless, some kind of consciousness of self did exist in 
ancient times because the pronoun existed and could be used for emphasis and self 
assertion (see note 1).  
The concept of a distinct operative entity: “a consciously thinking subject”2 was 
(and is) emphasized in modern languages by the convention of saying “I” with every verb 
in the first person and it is surely this which eventually demanded recognition in 
philosophy of the 18th and 19th century. So at least I explain the adoption of the ancient 
pronoun as an abstraction capable of adjectival and nominal variations: egohood, egoity, 
egomania, egotism, egotistical, to mention some. As the prototypical symbol of man’s 
ability to reason and hence exist self-consciously and creatively in a sphere unattainable 
by animals, it refers to the highest member of the four member schema that Aristotle 
used. He designated this member as nous3, usually translated as mind, reason, intellect, 
giving the adjective noetic. To this limited extent the system of Aristotle is still current. 
But modern philosophy, with perhaps rare exceptions, has no perception of a 
macrocosmic intelligence—or at least would relegate it to speculation or religious faith—
whereas such a force was taken as a matter of course to be the active principle of the 
universe by ancient philosophers from Anaxagoras to Zeno and Plotinos.  
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One might conclude from this congeries of circumstances that human self-
consciousness has increased so dramatically in modern times as to blind it—in the sense 
that glaring lights blind the eyes—to any such correlative higher consciousness that was 
still almost automatically evident to earlier thinkers. Such thinkers could be described as 
more balanced than we—at least not isolated and alienated like many modern thinkers, 
especially existentialists—and this is perhaps generally the emotional reaction we have to 
ancient thought and art. Yet at the same time we find these latter, by our standards, 
strangely incurious about the possibility of fully experiencing and exploiting the 
physicality of self and world.  
In particular the later 20th century seems to have lost consciousness of the fact 
that the conception of a microcosmic ego—best known in its Platonic form—was based 
on—or, as it were, consisted of—three soul faculties. These are distinguishable if not 
easily definable and they seem at least analogous to what 19th century philosophy 
regularized conceptually as thinking, feeling and willing. I have been unable to find a 
methodical history of that concept but it was in practical usage at least by the time of 
Descartes4. These faculties are still very much a part of popular usage5 but there is no 
longer a trace of them in academic psychology as a triadic interlocking soul-unity, and 
seemingly the last exposition of them as such was given by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) 
and Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925) in the early part of this century. There has been, to my 
knowledge, no direct issue of Dilthey’s brief and almost mysteriously isolated and 
systematic exposition of the concept as an evolutionary process in the life of societies—
hence, in its macrocosmic aspect (see “The Structure of a World View” below). Steiner, 
working on both the microcosmic and macrocosmic level, seems to be the only thinker to 
make a direct connection with Aristotle’s views on the subject (to which I shall return) 
and evidently with Plato, in that he located these functions anatomically, although not in 
the same way as Plato.6  
In formulating these relationships I have not gone beyond the evidence but I am 
obliged to emphasize, if it is not clear already, that Greek “psychology” is much more 
fluid and, basically, seminal than Greek science, which was so firmly organized on the 
basis of the four elements. Even so, the question arises once again as to whether 
Platonic-Aristotelian soul triadism rationalizes some quite general, perhaps loose, 
conception that had been handed down. I believe that there is a case for a positive 
answer to be made, primarily, if not exclusively now, from the field of artistic convention. 
 
 
 
A triadic division of human psychic functions is described by Plato in the Timaeus. These 
seem to correspond roughly to thinking, feeling and willing in this way: the activity of 
high reasoning is said to take place in the head; courageous manly feeling (thumos, also 
thought-penetrated feeling) has its seat in the breast; and desire for food, drink, etc. is 
considered to originate in the belly but can get out of hand and override rational control. 
There may be hints of this view in earlier literature, which remains to be investigated.7 
Above all, however, the fact that Plato himself embodied the moral consequences of this 
 CHAPTER I: TOWARD DEFINING THE EGO 11  
 
system in a striking pictorial image in the Phaedrus can perhaps suggest a course of 
investigation into iconography: a charioteer (generally equated with the reflective part of 
the soul: logistikon) is confronted with the task of controlling his steeds of whom one “is 
noble and good, and of good stock, while the other has the opposite character, and his 
stock is opposite” (Hackforth translation).8 We are almost, if not quite, compelled to 
suppose that the “spirited (thumoeides)” and “appetitive (epithumetikon)” souls are 
alluded to as the driver seeks to keep his winged steeds from grounding.  
It is not a question of weighing this passage as proof of a doctrine but of seeing it 
as an artistic reflection of a fundamental orientation toward human behavior. It is not 
necessarily inconsistent of Plato to think at one point in terms of a bipartite nature and 
at another to imply a tripartite soul. In the framework of the four member system, the 
physical body, nutritive and sensitive souls would constitute a mortal part and the nous 
as a whole an immortal part,9 just as we speak in popular language of the body-mind 
split. In Aristotle, a similar dichotomy: rational-irrational is mentioned as a 
contemporary usage. But none of this prevents the same thinker, in another context, 
from looking at nous with a magnifying glass and finding it to consist in a tripartite 
structure. In the chariot myth nous is surely to be thought of as something intact in itself, 
whether incarnate and hence bound in with the lower members or discarnate, as it would 
be in a god. If we go to the Timaeus for Plato’s more clinical analysis of the nous, and 
obviously the one to be preferred, we find that only a part of it, the logistikon, is actually 
divine. It is quite understandable that Plato should approach such complicated matters 
with diffidence. He himself does not admit to confusion about them but he may have felt 
that to deal with them in sufficient depth was not right for his purposes or for the times, 
especially if his ultimate source was the Mysteries of which he was an initiate, so that 
great discretion was in order.  
The poetic quality of the myth, which involves a description of how human beings 
incarnate and then find themselves faced with diverging or unharmonious forces, is 
heightened by the contrast with Zeus who as a discarnate deity has no such problems in 
driving, for (the chariots of the gods) “are well-balanced and readily guided; but for the 
others (men) it is hard, by reason of the heaviness of the steed of wickedness, which pulls 
down the driver with his weight, except that driver have schooled him well” (Hackforth). 
Surely the general idea for the picture must come from the story of Phaeton and Helios10, 
for the basic parallel occurs there: Helios never had any trouble keeping his steeds on 
exactly the right course (they were well schooled), but Phaeton, as not fully divine, could 
not manage them and came to grief. I refer here only to artistic continuity, not continuity 
of content.  
Out of his poetic consciousness Plato suggested a visual image of great power, 
one that can offer inner guidance. We know from Egyptian and Christian iconography 
that morally educative concepts could be conveyed in actual visual images supplied by 
written sources (Book of the Dead, Bible). In Minoan/Myceanaean Greece—a culture 
without such a (known) written source—there are iconographic elements that suggest 
similar educative concepts.11 Faute de mieux one may suggest that these were handed 
down verbally, perhaps leading to adaptations in literary form.12 Plato’s chariot imagery 
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seems to offer itself as a microcosmic moral lesson, but the collective application of the 
same idea, as the structural principle of the state given in the Republic, is so insistent 
that it has tempted some commentators to regard the military contingencies involved in 
activating it as the source of tripartition in Plato’s works.13 In the light of the chariot 
myth such an interpretation is altogether too simple a solution. Moreover, the parallel 
myth of moral choice, Herakles at the Crossroads, guarantees that Plato did not have to 
observe the state in order to achieve a concept of three factors: a conscious agent and a 
choice between good and bad14.  
Aristotle proceeded differently from Plato. Eschewing poetic visions, he worked 
in the dispassionate manner of a scientist in dealing with the theme of the triadic ego. 
First he gives an account of the nutritive and sensitive souls and then, instead of 
referring directly to the nous, mentions three further soul members which at first sight 
have a strong resemblance to the system of Plato, viz., (at 433bl): “an intellective, a 
deliberative and now an appetitive part; for these are more different from one another 
than the faculties of desire and passion” (J. A. Smith translation).15 The latter comment 
is not entirely easy to understand, especially since Aristotle did not really explain his own 
version of the triadic nous, nor give its source. The passage has regularly been taken to 
be a rejection of Plato’s system. In this regard it may be noted that Aristotle uses the 
term epithumetikon (desirous) and thumikon (high-spirited) both in this passage and 
earlier in 432a22 and seems to have regarded them as subsumable—as two aspects of 
one faculty(?)16—under other faculties. In the earlier of the passages he introduces the 
imaginative soul above the sensitive soul—incompatibly with the neat multi-partite list in 
433bl. In any case, his main criticism is that he equates Plato’s epithumetikon and 
thumikon17 with his own orektikon and does not want to see the latter divided. He also 
has reservations about having appetite appear in all three faculties. In modern triadic 
theories (Dilthey and Steiner) such an admixture of soul qualities is regarded as natural 
and necessary, even though one quality is always recognizably dominant.  
Out of all this complexity I believe that a few general conclusions can 
nevertheless be drawn. First, although Aristotle clearly did not approve of Plato’s 
terminology and what he thought it harbored, he was by no means specifically rejecting 
the whole idea of a triadic ego; in fact, the version of it he reports in 433bl seems to 
suggest that, if one were to pursue that line of investigation, one would have to use this 
particular frame of reference as a scientific starting point18. He himself chose not to do so 
and we hear no more of it in a systematic sense. Perhaps the conception of nous 
pathetikos and nous poetikos, which he apparently originated, seemed a more promising 
way to investigate the human mind, even though again he did not discuss it very 
extensively and it remained for later philosophers, particularly in the Middle Ages, to 
raise a philosophical structure on it. In this realm we see Aristotle pretty much as a 
compiler of current ideas—and a tripartite ego must have been one of them.  
The second conclusion is correlative. In the circumstances it is impossible to 
imagine that Plato did not know the concept of the three lower members. If he did take 
them for granted, then his triad in the Timaeus is indeed his version of the subdivisions 
of the nous. Furthermore, pace Aristotle, the sense of these subdivisions does not seem 
irreconcilable19 with the sense of Aristotle’s list at 433bl. And despite the more vague 
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poetic references elsewhere, Plato’s treatment of the triadic concept in the Timaeus 
shows the characteristic Classical consciousness of the human organism which is so 
dynamically revealed in the phenomenon of the contrapposto stance; for he locates his 
souls among the actual areas and organs of the physical body.  
I should find it difficult to doubt that both philosophers were aware of a 
conception of the structure of the nous as three soul faculties which is as basic to the 
reality of the human being as the Four Elements theory is to the general cosmic 
structure. The souls-theory, if the artistic parallels are to be trusted, has a traditional 
aspect but seemingly very little an intellectual one—or at least this was not agreed on—
and was therefore not something that could pass into the general consciousness in the 
same way as the Four Elements theory. Its brief appearance, as if by the raising and 
lowering of a curtain, in the Late Classical period nevertheless technically rounds off the 
achievements of Classical Greece as the prototype of all subsequent cultural development 
in Europe.  
Aristotle, choosing to let the triadic ego as a theme for investigation drop, left it to 
continue a subterranean existence in artistic composition, which is yet to be properly 
investigated. In his investigation of thinking, however, and in his conviction that mind 
and nature comprise a unity, Aristotle kept his psychology within the Classical spiritual 
vision, although driving it to a point where it could no longer be understood even by his 
closest successors, as has been pointed out by a recent sympathetic critic.20 This is 
basically in accord with the view of Rudolf Steiner, which is worth quoting as a kind of 
summary21 of the ancient and a modern view of the triadic ego: 
Many of the expressions used by Aristotle are no longer understood. However, they are 
reminders that there was a time when individual members of man’s soul being were 
known; not until Aristotle did they become abstractions. Franz Brentano (1838–1917, 
German professor of philosophy—ed.) made great efforts to understand these members of 
man’s soul precisely through that thinker of antiquity, Aristotle. It must be said, however, 
that it was just through Aristotle that their meaning began to fade from mankind’s 
historical evolution. Aristotle distinguishes in man the vegetative soul, by which he means 
approximately what we call ether body, then the aesthetikon or sensitive soul, which we 
call the sentient or astral body. Next he speaks of orektikon which corresponds to sentient 
soul, then comes kinetikon corresponding to the intellectual soul, and he uses the term 
dianoetikon for the consciousness soul. Aristotle was fully aware of the meaning of these 
concepts, but he lacked direct perception of their reality. This caused a certain unclarity 
and abstraction in his works, and that applies also to the book I mentioned by Franz 
Brentano. Nevertheless, real thinking holds sway in Brentano’s book. And when someone 
applies himself to the power of thinking the way he did, it is no longer possible to 
entertain the foolish notion that man’s soul and spirit are mere by-products arising from 
the physical-bodily nature. The concepts formulated by Brentano on the basis of 
Aristotle’s work were too substantial, so to speak, to allow him to succumb to the mischief 
of modern materialism. 
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RECAPITULATION AND INTERPRETATION OF DILTHEY’S 
“STRUCTURE OF A WORLD VIEW” (SEE APPENDIX A)  
Dilthey discusses his “Structure of a World View” in terms of psychical processes (three 
phases of consciousness) which occur (and recur) in a fixed order, that is, over a period 
of time which is required for a development and its true fulfillment. The “structure” rests 
on a concept of reality which can be called a cosmic (thought) picture. On the basis of 
this, situations and objects are evaluated in sympathy and antipathy (feeling), thus 
fostering ultimately the formation and direction of the will. In this way Dilthey sees the 
formation and then the simultaneous operation of first one substratum, then two, with a 
new leading principle, until finally all three are intermingled in a whole (three-story) 
edifice: “indeed a structure, where eventually the permeating influence of the soul finds 
its expression”.  
In another sentence he terms this “a structure of psychological life”. The 
successive steps are now more clearly defined: observation of occurrences within us and 
objects outside us; clarification of such observation by emphasizing fundamental 
relations of reality; depiction and classification of these in a world of ideas (essentially all 
this is the activity of thinking); in the second stage: becoming conscious of ourselves we 
enjoy the full measure of our existence; then we ascribe to objects and persons around us 
a certain effectual value; we then determine these values according to their prospective 
influence, useful or harmful, giving rise to a search for an absolute standard of 
measurement, a way to evaluate meaningfulness. (In short, at this level we are guided 
primarily by our life of feeling). The third is the highest stage, for here are the ideals, the 
highest good and the supreme principles. This stage also is experienced in three phases: 
momentary intent, striving and tendency; permanent aims directed toward the 
realization of a concept (relation between means and ends, choice between goals, 
selection of means of attainment); the final systematization of all aims into a highest 
order of our practical behavior—highest good, highest norm, highest personal and social 
ideal. (All this, if properly realized, amounts to transmutation, if not transfiguration, of 
our life of will).  
In reviewing Dilthey’s formulations, we realize that the whole process includes 
nine phases in three groups of three, as follows:  
• Thinking  
• feeling  
• willing  
Cognitive activity dominates throughout.  
• thinking  
• Feeling  
• willing  
Affective activity dominates throughout.  
• thinking  
• feeling  
• Willing  
Volitional activity dominates throughout.  
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THE AUTHOR’S CONCEPTION OF HOW “THE STRUCTURE 
OF A WORLD VIEW” MAY THROW LIGHT ON GREEK ART22  
First of all, I consider it necessary to find another term for the translation of 
“Weltanschauung” than (the usual) “world view”, for this latter seems less flexible in 
English than its equivalent in German. I suggest “understanding of life” in the sense of 
an active, as opposed to a contemplative, process. This has at least two advantages: it 
eliminates any overtones of political power struggles that may be present in the literal 
translation, and it calls attention to Dilthey’s real contribution, which is to insist that an 
emotional and a volitional factor are just as significant for a view of life as an intellectual 
one. For this is often ignored or suppressed in arguments by antagonists who imagine or 
pretend that they are acting purely out of principles arrived at only by rigorous 
intellectual analysis unadulterated by their own deep emotional prejudices and 
intentions.  
Thus, if considered with an open mind, Dilthey’s analysis of human activity is so 
disarmingly simple and indisputably cogent as to seem an unexceptionable 
commonplace: any completed human endeavor must have had a beginning, reached a 
middle and then an end stage. But to explain this, the dynamic energy inherent in the 
endeavor has to be considered. It must have been planned (thought out) out of a physical 
and soul environment. Then the feeling life of the planner must have consented to 
execute the plan; and, finally, the will actually to achieve it—to whatever degree 
successfully—had to have been activated. It is clear that these phases are present whether 
the activity is quite private, or in a social context (affecting other people) or, indeed, 
carried out in cooperation with other people (in which case complexities in clearly 
differentiating the stages can easily be imagined).  
But Dilthey goes further. He sees this threefold sequence as so fundamental that, 
in any long term endeavor, it is repeated as a necessary, inescapable technique of the 
human condition within each one of the stages. Thus the planning stage, the stage of 
primarily intellectual activity, goes through a subtle metamorphosis of feeling and 
willing—but always under the aegis of the intellectual, structural problem involved—in 
order to get successfully to the next major phase, in which the feelings are aroused to 
justify, judge, above all to feel joy or satisfaction (or even the opposite) in the creativity 
that is going on. But always, feeling is decisive for the carrying on of the project. It is not 
uncommon at this stage to say: I feel that the project cannot be carried out because the 
planning is insufficient, the enthusiasm of the co-workers has dissipated, the opposition 
is too great or the criticism too devastating, etc. Supposing that the second stage has in 
fact been successfully achieved, then the third phase is one of refining and honing the 
“product” for distribution, for wider use, for admiration, for influencing the course of 
things willfully. It is easy to see how this process might involve renewed intellectual 
consideration and judgmental activity to accommodate changing or unexpected 
conditions—but always with the now fully aroused volition in control.  
I do not pretend to be a Dilthey specialist, but even with considerable effort I 
have not been able to discover any attempt by him or his followers to apply this 
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theoretical pattern of periodicity for the emergence of an “understanding of life” to the 
life of a specific person or culture, though it seems to have a potential value in either 
case. Obviously, real life comes upon us in such a complicated way that one may not 
easily become aware of patterns of events. Moreover, in our age there can be an 
underlying fear that any theory of patterns in human activity is incompatible with 
freedom of action, particularly of artists. Such an objection seems to me to result from 
comparing apples and oranges: the problem of freedom, in the sense intended, exists on 
the level of morality and, above all, on the level of individuality. Our conception of these 
levels is strongly affected by the materialistic, scientific civilization in which we live, 
whereas earlier cultures had quite other conditions with their own special conception of 
morality and of individual freedom—if they had any conception of the latter.  
In any case, what Dilthey proposed has nothing to do with the problem of 
freedom of action, which does not legitimately arise in this context. For his reasoning 
concerns only the natural limitations which the sheer task of physically functioning on a 
purposeful basis in a material environment imposes on any human being any time, 
anywhere. The effectuation of any impulse in the plastic arts, for example, ultimately 
involves a sequence of phases by an individual or a group of individuals. Character, 
status, destiny itself are marked by the thousand-fold coping with the sequence over the 
lifetime of an individual or—in the collective sense—throughout an era. This process 
itself is not a case of “determinism”, for not the goals are what Dilthey had in mind but 
the process by which, for better or for worse, they are achieved.  
Accordingly, in my attempt in Chapter IV to make Dilthey’s insights fruitful in 
understanding the emergence of Greek sculpture, it must be reiterated: the stages by 
which it emerged reflect only the procedural solutions with which Greek sculptors 
responded to felt needs. In this study, the philosophy of the four elements is treated as 
the underlying “understanding of life” of the Greeks, that is, the driving force to which 
expression is given by Greek art. The unceasing metamorphoses of this force have 
emerged for me more clearly by taking into account Dilthey’s stages than would be the 
case without them.  
To try to clarify this in another way: the stages themselves have nothing to do 
with the reasons of the Greeks for making sculpture, or the socio-religious-economic 
conditions in which it emerged. All that exists on another level. The stages involved are 
thus not “an understanding of life” but only the vehicle for one. It is perhaps doubtful 
that such stages could emerge very clearly in the study of more recent, especially 
contemporary, art, for we are too close to it. But the situation of Greek art is more 
favorable. First, it has receded far enough from us in time that we can get a certain 
perspective on it. Second, Greek culture in general as seen in this perspective was 
extraordinarily homogeneous and original, regardless of the varied influences it 
absorbed, or may have absorbed, and of internal interactions of Greek city states; and it 
lasted over a long period of time, by any standards. However, with the increasing 
complexity of Greek culture and its position in the world in the later 4th century and 
especially in the Hellenistic period, it is much more difficult to discern the sub-phases 
(Dilthey’s microperiods) than in the earlier periods. At the risk of being importunate, I 
shall state again that his macro- and micro-periods have no existence whatsoever in 
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themselves. Only in conjunction with “an understanding of life” do they become 
operative. At that point, the question can be raised as to when and how they are 
effectuated. That is the question posited here in relation to Greek art.  
My task will, therefore, be to evaluate the progress of Greek art from its 
beginnings in terms of the “understanding of life” behind it. This understanding I take to 
be the emergent, exploratory, not fully conscious goal-seeking which culminated 
conceptually in the Four Elements philosophy of Empedokles, but did not ever cease to 
be lived out. To achieve this I will assume that this “understanding of life” went forward 
in some semblance of the Diltheyan stages. Can these in fact be recognized? At this point 
a reader might have the impression that such an undertaking would not bring us closer 
to life—as Dilthey intended—but remain theoretical. Against this I must affirm that such 
was not my experience in actually creating Chapter IV (where the stages are worked out) 
and simultaneously ask for suspension of judgement until the entire chapter has been 
read. Moreover, as a kind of prelude to Chapter IV I have experimented with a project 
closer to our times. Is there an “understanding of life” which scholars who (have worked 
and) work on ancient art take for granted, and if so is this collective understanding and 
the work resulting from it susceptible of being articulated in the Diltheyan stages? These 
questions proved to have sufficient substance in their own right to justify a separate 
chapter (II), as well as being a “dry-run” for Chapter IV. Chapter III takes up an 
additional factor of importance to the results of Chapter II: the difference of the time-
sense of the Greeks from our own time-sense.  
 
